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THE CY PRES DOCTRINE AND CHANGING
PHILOSOPHIES
Edith L. Fisch*

T

HE cy pres doctrine1 arose so far back in antiquity that its origins are

obscure. Apparently it was known and used in Roman law, for
an application of the cy pres doctrine is reported in the Digest of
Justinian. In the early part of the third century a city received a legacy
bequeathed for the purpose of commemorating the memory of the donor
by using the income of the legacy to hold yearly games. As such games
were illegal at that time a problem arose concerning the disposition of
the legacy. Modestinus, a well known jurist, found the solution.
"Since the testator wished games to be celebrated which are
not permitted, it would be unjust that the amount which he has
destined to that end should go back to his heirs. Therefore, let
the heirs and magnates of the city be cited and let an examination
be made to ascertain how the trust may be employed so that the
memory of the deceased may be preserved in some other and
lawful manner." 2
The precise manner in which the cy pres doctrine was introduced
into English law is not known. It appears probable that it was adopted
in connection with the medieval practice of alms giving as a means of
expiating sin. "After baptism," says Cyprian, "we would have no resource to expiate our continual faults, if the divine compassion had not
taught us works of justice and pity as a way of safety, and alms as a
means of washing out the stains of our vices."3 It was thus common
for men who wished to avoid the clutches of the devil and the tortures
of hell to attempt to buy their way into heaven by giving property to
charity. That the donors were conscious of the fact that the transac,. Member, New York and Federal Bars.-Ed.
The RESTATEMENT OP TRUSTS §399 (1935) defines the cy pres doctrine as follows:
"If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or
becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the
settler manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes,
the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settler."
2 DxcBST OP JusTINIAN 33:2:16. The cy pres doctrine was not an innovation of
Christianity as it was used before the time of Constantine. See 3 STORY, EQUITY JumsPRUDBNCB, 14th ed., §1518 (1918).
3 Willard, ''Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres," 8 HA.nv. L. REv. 69 at 72 (1894).
See also ZoLLMAN, AMBRicAN LAw oP CHARinBs 71 (1924).
1
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tion was a deliberate purchase is evidenced by the use of the phrase
"for the health of my soul" in connection with the charitable gift. 4
Sir Thomas Wyndham wrote in his will in 1521: 5
"... I trust that ... thy blessyd mother [of Christ] will in my
moost extreme _nede, of her infinite pitye, take my soule into
her hands, and hit present unto her moost dere sonne.... Also to
the singular mediacions, and prayers of all the holy company of
hevyn, aungells, archaungells, patriarches, prophets, apostells,
evangelists, martyres, confessoures, and virgynes; and specially to
myn accustomeed advourrys, I call and crye, Saint John Evangelist,
Saint George, Saint Thomas of Canterbury, Saint Margaret, Saint
Kateryn, and Saint Barbara, humbly beseche you, that not onlye at
the houre of deth, soo too ayde, socour, and defend me; that the
auncyent and goostly enemy, nor noon other yll or dampnabell
- spirite, have power to invade me, nor with his tereablenes to
anoye me...."

In return for these benefits he then set forth the price he would pay:
"Also I will have immediatelie after my decesse, as shortly as
may be possible [a thousand] masses to be said within the citie of
Norwich, and other places, within the shire of Norfolk; whereof
I will have, in honor of the blessed T rinitie, one hundreth; in
honor of the :6.ve wounds of our Savyour ,J'hu Crist,· one hundredth; in honour of the :6.ve joys of our blissed Lady, one hundreth; in honor of the nine orders of Aungells, one hundreth; in
honor of the Patriarchs, one hundreth; in honor of the twelve
Apostells, one hundreth...."
The English chancellors with their ecclesiastical background and
training in Roman law resurrected the cy pres doctrine as a means of
permitting the donor to obtain the salvation he was seeking to buy, the
theory being that as the testator by donating money to charity could
purchase a position in the heavenly kingdom he ought not to be denied
entrance if the gift, for some unforeseen reason, could not be carried
out in the manner specified by him. 6 Thus Lord Wilmot stated: "The
4 Willard, "illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres," 8 HAnv. L. R.Ev. 69 at 72 (1894).
See also Stat. Hen. VII, c. 4, I Stat. Realm, p. 285, "charitable deed to be done by their
executors for the health of their souls" was repeated three times in this statute.
0 NICHOLAS, TESTAMENTA VETUSTA 579 (1826).
6 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §431 (1935): "If the exact scheme for securing
pardon and an eternal period of bliss for the soul failed for any reason, it was natural that
chancezy, with its ecclesiastical tinge, should think that the testator would have desired the
substitution of any other plan which would bring about the same result as the original
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Court thought one kind of charity would embalm his memory as well as
another, and being equally meritorious, would entitle him to the same
reward." 7
Tudor attributes the use of the cy pres doctrine to the fact that
the chancellor having placed charities in a favored position gradually
began to treat the charity as a fictitious person entitled to the same
rights as any other cestui que trust. 8 The object designated by the
donor was thus treated as being merely the manner and mode of going into effect of a general charitable intent. This reasoning is illustrated by the following passage:
''Where a legacy is given so as to denote, that charity is the legatee, the Court does not hold, that the mode is of the substance of the
legacy; but will effectuate the gift to charity, as the substance; providing a mode for that legatee to take, which is not provided for
any other legatee."9
Whatever the reasons for the introduction of the cy pres doctrine
it is clear that long before the American Revolution it was a principle,
firmly established, in English law.10
American Development

l. Separation of Powers. Largely as a result of Montesquieu's
theory of separation of powers, the early American courts, unlike those
of England, were extremely hostile to the cy pres doctrine.11 In England the cy pres doctrine was of two types, prerogative and judicial, the
prerogative power being exercised by the chancellor as the minister of
the king and the judicial power in his capacity of an equity judge.12
Montesquieu reasoned that in order to have political liberty there must
be three types of separate powers, the executive, the legislative and the
gift." Cf. Attorney General v. Dutch Reformed Protestant Church, 36 N.Y. 452 at 457
(1867), affirming, 33 Barb. 303 (1866) (doctrine was used in England in order to save
gifts made for religious purposes and thereby subject property to control of the church).
7 Attorney General v. Downing, Wilmot 1, 33 (1767).
s Tunon, CHARITIES, 5th ed., 2-3 (1929).
9 Mills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483 at 486, 34 Eng. Rep. 595 at 596 (1815).
10 Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228, 7 Ves. 76 (1754); Attorney General v. Matthews,
2 Lev. 167 (1677).
11 See cases cited infra note 19.
12 F1scII, THE CY PREs DoCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1950). The prerogative power was exercised where the object of the gift was illegal or void as contrary to
public policy, and where a gift was made to charity generally without the interposition of
a trustee. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (1803), affd. 13 Ves.
Jr. 416, 33 Eng. Rep. 350 (1807).
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judicial.13 The political liberty of each citizen, he argued, involves
peace of mind, arising from the opinion of each person that he has
safety. When the legislative and executive powers are vested in the
same person or in the same political body, there can be no liberty because the citizen becomes apprehensive and fears that the same individual or body will enact tyrannical and oppressive law. There would also
be no liberty, if the judicial power were not separated from the legislative and executive, for then the life and liberty of the citizen would
be subject to arbitrary control. Were it not for the executive power the
judge might act "with all the violence of an oppressor."14
The American courts endorsing this theory rejected the prerogative
cy pres on the ground that the principle of separation of powers forbids
the exercise of a legislative or executive power by a judicial body.15
Thus the court in Jacleson ·v. Phillips,1 6 in regard to a situation in which
the prerogative cy pres was applicable in England, remarked:
"No instance is reported, or has been discovered in the thorough
investigations of the subject, of an exercise of this power (prerogative cy pres) in England before the reign of Charles IL . . .
It has never, so far as we know, been introduced into the practice of any court in this ~ountry; and, if it exists anywhere here,
it is in the legislature of the Commonwealth as succeeding to the
powers of the king as parens patriae. . . . It certainly cannot be
exercised by the judiciary of a state whose constitution declares
that 'the judicial department shall never exercise the legislative
131 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (1802 ed.).
14 Id. at 43. John Locke's concept of checks and balances also had great influence
in the United States. Like Montesquieu, Locke advocated the separation of the legislative
and the executive in order to prevent an abuse of power. Although Locke said nothing
about the judiciary, wherever the system of checks and balances had been established the
judiciary has become a third independent branch of government. See RussELL, HISTORY OF
WESTERN PmLOSl'HY 508 (1945).
15 Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees and Executors, 4 Dana 354, 366 (Ky. 1836);
Parsons v. Childs, 345 Mo. 689, 136 S.W. (2d) 327 (1940), cert. den. 310 U.S. 640, 60
S.Ct. 1088 (1940), rehearing den. 311 U.S. 724, 61 S.Ct. 55 (1940); Green v. Allen,
5 Humph. 170 (Tenn. 1844); Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900).
But cf. First Congregational Society v. City of Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22, 121 A. 77 at 80
(1923), where the court said: "The jurisdiction of the courts over charitable trusts is administered not only under these liberal rules of construction, but also under the undoubted
right of the court to exercise prerogative authority in dealing with a charitable gift. That
authority gives to it the right to apply the cy pres doctrine to charitable trusts. . . ." The
judicial exercise of prerogative cy pres has since been repudiated in Connecticut. Shannon
v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77 at 86, 179 A. 479 (1935).
16 14 Allen 539 (Mass. 1867) (the court was discussing a gift given to charity generally without the interposition of a trustee).
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and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a
government of laws and not men.' "17
To the newly founded republic the idea of the judiciary exercising
the prerogative power of the English sovereign was anathema. Consequently, not only was the prerogative cy pres doctrine rejected18 but
many courts, in an excess of zeal, erroneously assumed that the cy
pres doctrine was solely a prerogative principle and rejected the entire
doctrine.19 Doughten v. Vandever, 20 decided in Delaware in 1875, is
typical of those cases in which the nature of the cy pres doctrine was
misconceived. Here the court stated that the cy pres doctrine was a
doctrine of prerogative and for this reason could not be exercised by an
equity court which has only judicial powers. That the court was unaware that the cy pres doctrine also existed judicially is revealed by
the following statement:
"The principle or doctrine of the exercise of this ministerial
function of the English chancellor was what is known as cy pres; that
is to say, where there was a definite charitable purpose which
could not take place, the court would substitute another, and formerly of a very different character. It was not, however, in the
exercise of the judicial function of his office, but in the exercise of
his ministerial function, that the English chancellor applied the
fund to a different purpose from that contemplated by the testator,
provided it was charitable."21
This unfortunate rejection of both the prerogative and judicial cy
pres coupled with the refusal of the courts to re-examine the nature of
the doctrine resulted in the destruction of charitable trusts that would
17 Id. at 576. It is interesting to note that even today some courts refuse to uphold
charitable gifts in situations where the prerogative cy pres was applicable in England. See,
for example, Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 179 A. 479 at 482 (1935); Levin v. Attorney General, 136 N. J. Eq. 568, 42 A. (2d) 870 at 871 (1945).
18 See cases cited supra note 15.
19 Carter v. Balfour's Administrator, 19 Ala. 814 (1851); White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31
(1852); Dougliten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51 (1875); Beall v. Drane, 25 Ga. 430 (1858);
Miller v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa 315 (1856); Cromie's Heirs v. Louisville Orphans' Home
Society, 3 Bush 365 (Ky. 1867); Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N.W. 1104
(1904); In re Creighton's Estate, 60 Neb. 796, 84 N.W. 273 (1900); Williams v. Williams, 4 Seld. 525 (N.Y. 1853); Keith v. Scales, 124 N.C. 337, 32 S.E. 809 (1899); Witman v. Lex, 17 S. & R. 88 (Pa. 1827); Attorney General v. Jolly, 2 Stroh. Eq. 379 (S.C.
1848); Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 162 (Tenn. 1844); Gallego's Exrs. v. Attorney General,
3 Leiglit 450 (Va. 1832); Heiss v. Murphy, 40 Wis. 276, 292 (1876).
20 5 Del. Ch. 51 (1875).
21 Id. at 64.
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otherwise have been saved by adapting them to changing social and
economic conditions.
·
2. Stress on Private Property. Not only was the cy pres doctrine
held to violate the principle of separation of powers but it was also
condemned as unsuited to our democratic institutions.22 This conclusion arose from the fact that the king's prerogative power over charities
was exercised without regard to the intention of the donor. As a result
property was sometimes devoted to purposes which were contrary to
the desires of the donor. 23 A notorious example of such a subversion
of intention is found in the case of Da Costa v. De Pas,24 decided in
1754, where a gift was left by a testator to establish a "Jesuba" to read
the Jewish law and instruct people in the Jewish religion. Gifts to
promote the Jewish religion were illegal in England at that time. The
legacy thus became subject to disposition by the prerogative power of
the king who ordered the fund applied to the support of a preacher in
a foundling home so that the children therein might receive instruction
in the Christian religion. Such extreme and unrestrained applications
of the prerogative cy pres doctrine prejudiced some American courts
against both branches of the doctrine, judicial as well as prerogative
and consequently those courts which failed to observe that the judicial
cy pres was not applied arbitrarily rejected the whole doctrine. 25 That
the objection to the cy pres doctrine was not merely because it was
mistakenly supposed to be only a doctrine of prerogative is shown by
the Mississippi case of National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 26 decided
as recently as 1933. Referring to the cy pres doctrine the court stated:
'Without regard to the refinement of distinction between the
use of the term of 'cy pres' to describe the power exercised by the
English chancellors in charity cases under the sign manual of the
crown, on the one hand, and that exercised under the assumed
general jurisdiction of equity, on the other, the practice in either
case is incompatible with the public and judicial policy of this
state...."27
22

See cases cited infra notes 27-31.

2s Scon, TnusTs §399.1 (1939).

241 Amb. 228, 7 Ves. 76 (1754).
25 Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 210, 100 N.W. 1104 (1904); see Jackson v.
Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 575 (Mass. 1867). See also cases cited infra notes 26-31.
26 167 Minn. 571, 148 S. 649 (1933).
21 Id. at 652-653. Emphasis added.
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This view still obtains in North Carolina,28 South Carolina,29 Tennessee,30 and Mississippi.31
Thus the cy pres doctrine was objected to, not only because it was
thought to be incompatible with the theory of separation of powers, but
because it was deemed undemocratic in that it violated the natural rights
of man, particularly his right of property, and it is here that John
Locke's influence can be felt. Although he contributed much to the
American legal system by his theory of natural rights, Locke's great
reverence for private property hindered the development of the cy pres
doctrine. According to his theory of a social compact the individual
does not give up all his natural rights to the government but only the
right to be a judge in his own case. Consistently with this theory Locke
declared: "The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of
his property without his own consent."32 When refusing to apply the
cy pres doctrine the courts reaffirmed this principle. In Moore's Heirs
v. Moore's Devisees and Executors, 33 the court stated that it did not
act judicially when it applied the testator's bounty
"... to a specific object of charity, selected by itself, merely because he had dedicated it to charity generally, or to a specified
purpose which can not be effectuated; for the court can not know
or decide that he would have been willing that it should be
applied to the object to which the judge, in the plenitude of his
unregulated discretion and peculiar benevolence, has seen fit to
decree its appropriation, where he, and not the donor, in effect
and at last, creates the charity~"34
The great reverence for private property prevailing at this period,
was also manifested by. those decisions in which application of the
doctrine was denied, not because of a misconception as to the nature
28 Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E. (2d) 419 (1941); Board of Education
of Wilson County v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E. (2d) 544 (1939); Bridges v.
Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. 26 (N.C. 1845).
29Mars v. Gibert, 93 S.C. 455, 77 S.E. 131 (1913); Brenan v. Winkler, 37 S.C. 457,
16 S.E. 190 (1892).
80 Henshaw v. Flenniken, 183 Tenn. 232, 191 S.W. (2d) 541 (1946).
31 National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167 Miss. 571, 148 S. 649 (1933).
82 Lomm, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 187 (Everyman edition, 1924).
83 4 Dana 354 (Ky. 1836).
84 Jd. at 366. Similar reasoning is found in McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276 at
280 (16 N.C.) (1828), where the court refused to apply the cy pres doctrine on the ground
that "We can not dispose of the property of the decease[d] by undertaking to conjecture
what would have been his will, provided he had foreseen what has since happened, which
has thwarted his intent as expressed."
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of the doctrine, but because of a reluctance to vary the original plans
of the donor. As it was believed that no clear line could be drawn
between the directions of the donor and confiscation, courts were fearful that deviations from the directions of the donor would result in the
overthrow of charitable trusts and ultimately imperil the safety and
sacredness of all private property. 36 The case of Harvard College v.
Society for Promoting Theological Education,36 decided in 1855, clearly
reB.ects this attitude. Harvard College had received funds in trust for
the promotion of theological education at the college or at the divinity
school connected with the college. The trustees, claiming that the college and theological school could not be conveniently managed by the
same corporation and that the divinity school had become less useful
and effective because it was unable to assume a more marked sectarian
character than the present trustees deemed it their duty to permit, asked
the court to award the funds to an independent board of trustees, to be
applied to the support of the divinity school, distinct and separate from
the college. The court refusing to apply the cy pres doctrine to vary
the terms of the trust declared:
"A contrary decision would furnish a precedent dangerous to
the perpetuity and sacredness of all our great public charities,
leaving the question of the management and supervision of our
public charities to be the subject of change with every B.uctuation
of popular opinion as to what may be the more expedient and useful mode of administering them."37
This case is characteristic of this era when the question of how the
trust could best be utilized for the benefit of society was excluded from
consideration and it was held that the court could not substitute a new
scheme merely because the court or the trustees believed that it would
- be a better plan than that created by the settlor.38 Decisions of this type
35 State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570 at 580 (1869) ("H the original trust, in all its requirements, is not obligatory, where shall the line be drawn? and what is to hinder a total
perversion of the fund? H a change can be made so material as one affecting the choice of
curators, I can see no limit"). Bentham felt that a threat to property was also a threat to
law. BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 85 (1945). Cf. MILL, D1sSERTATIONS AND DxscUSSIONS 35 (1865).
36 3 Gray 280 (Mass. 1855).
37 Id. at 301.
38 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Attorney General, 234 Mass. 261, 125 N.E.
392 (1919); President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Attorney General, 228 Mass. 396,
117 N.E. 903 (1917); Crawford v. Nies, 224 Mass. 474, 113 N.E. 408 (1916) ("whenever
a charitable trust can be administered in accordance with the directions of the donor or
founder, this court 'is not at liberty to modify it upon considerations of policy or convenience."'); Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 592 (Mass. 1867) (policy and convenience
cannot be considered by the court); Crow v. Clay County, 196 Mo. 234, 95 S.W. 369
(1906). Cf. ScoTT, TRusTs §399.4 (1939).
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stemmed not only from Locke's philosophy but also from Blackstone
who had great influence on the early courts of this country. Speaking
of the great regard of the law for private property Blackstone stated that
the law would not authorize the least violation of it, not even for the
general good of the whole community.39
"In vain, may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought
to yield to that of the community, for it would be dangerous to
allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be judge of
this common good, and to decide on its expediency."40
Consequently, for many years the courts favored the dead hand over
the public welfare41 and as recently as 1923 a court in refusing to apply
the cy pres doctrine announced:
"No public benefit, no increased beneficience, no advantage
to religious activity, can justify a court in making over the wills or
contracts of men, in the conviction that changed conditions make
this, if not necessary, at least highly desirable."42
3. Balancing Between Individual and Society. After 1900 the tide
of public thinking flowed away from emphasis on the individual and
towards society as a whole with the result that fewer courts were influ39BucKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 74 (Gavit ed. 1941).
40 Ibid.
41 White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31 (1852); Starkweather v. American Bible Society, 72
Ill. 50 (1874); Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School for Boys of the City of Louisville, 107 Ky. 382, 54 S.W. 200 (1899); Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Me. 133, 29 A. 949
(1894); McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276 (N.C. 1828); In re Long's Estate, 204 Pa.
60, 53 A. 497 (1902); Gladding v. St. Matthew's Church, 25 R.I. 628, 57 A. 860 (1904).
The preference for individual ownership of wealth appears in the case of Doughten v.
Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 77 (1875), where the court after upholding various charitable
gifts stated: "I am aware that I have in this opinion gone quite far enough in the application of well-recognized equitable principles to charitable uses. It would not have been
a matter of regret to me if I had been able to arrive at different conclusions. There is
nothing in the will of Amy Doughten, with respect to these charitable bequests, at the
expense of her relatives in blood, that meets the approval of my judgment. Her example in
this respect I would not commend as worthy of imitation; and nothing but a sense of duty,
which compels me to follow the law as expounded by courts of equity, has caused me to give
an interpretation to the provisions of her will and the codicil thereto by which her heirs
at law are excluded from the benefit of sharing her estate." See also note, "Revaluation of
Cy Pres," 49 YALE L.J. 303 at 317 (1939). But cf. Bradway, "Tendencies in Application
of the Cy Pres Doctrine," 5 TEMFLE L.Q. 489, 582 (1931), where the reluctance of the
courts to apply the cy pres doctrine during this period is attributed to the desire to encourage
charitable gifts, the theory being that if prospective donors were secure in the belief that
their desires would be adhered to throughout the years they would be encouraged to give
property in trust for charity.
42 First Congregational Society v. City of Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22 at 37, 121 A. 77
(1923). Other comparatively recent decisions that emphasize the intent of the testator are:
Harvard College v. Jewett, (6th Cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 119; Lovelace v. Marion Institute,
215 Ala. 271, 110 S. 381 (1926); Murr v. Youse, 81 Ohio App. 253, 80 N.E. (2d) 788
(1946).
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enced by the great reverence for private property championed by Blackstone and Locke. 43 The transition from stress on the dead hand to
interest in public benefit is in accord with Pound's legal philosophy.
Writing in 1906, Pound stated that the exaggerated respect for the
rights of the individual are common-law doctrines and while men have
changed their views as to the relative importance of the individual and
of society the common law has not changed. Pound went on to declare
that "No amount of admiration for our traditional system should blind
us to the obvious fact that it exhibits too great a respect for the individual, and for the entrenched position in which our legal and political
history has put him and too little respect for the needs of society, when
they come in conB.ict with the individual, to be in touch with the present age." 44 "The problem, therefore, of the present is to lead our law
to hold a more even balance between individualism and collectivism.
Its present extreme individualism must be tempered to meet the ideas
of the modem world."46 The common-law stress on individualism was
merely a revolt from the spirit of the Middle Ages, and this revolt
carried beyond its time and as a basis of a permanent theory of society
is regarded by Pound as not only false but dangerous. "Those who still
repeat its formulas are dealing in ideas of the past which have no application to the present age." 46 · We must therefore cease to mistake seventeenth century doctrine, in which temporary phases of its individualistic predilection were formulated, for fundamental principles of common law. 47
·In conformance with Pound's theory of balancing between indi43 The welfare of the beneficiaries rather than the intent of the donor was emphasized in the following cases: State National Bank of Texarkana v. Bann, 202 Ark. 850, 153
S.W. (2d) 158 (1941); McCarroll v. Grand Lodge I.O.O.F. of Arkansas, 154 Ark. 376,243
S.W. 870 (1922); Thatcher"v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W. (2d) 677 (1934); City of
Keene v. Eastman, 75 N.H. 191, 72 A. 213 (1909); Morristown Trust Co. v. Protestant
Episcopal Church, (N.J. 1948) 61 A. (2d) 762; Matter of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112
N.E. 177, 189 (1916), reversing 170 App. Div. 245, 156 N.Y.S. 387 (1915), which
affirmed 89 Misc. 323, 153 N.Y.S. 653 (1915); In re Mear's Estate, 229 Pa. 217, 149 A.
157 (1930); Morse v. National Bank of Galveston, (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) 194 S.W. (2d)
578; Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 476, 24 N.W. (2d) 893 (1946).
44Pound, "Spirit of the Common Law," 18 THE GREEN BAG 17 at 20 (1906).
45 Id. at 24. Cf. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 74 (Gavit ed. 1941).
46Pound, "Spirit of the Common Law," 18 THE GREEN BAG 17 at 24 (1906).
47 Ibid. Pound, however, does not completely forsake individualism. Although he
revolted against its exaggerated form in our legal system, he declared that with all its
faults, individualism is a salutory and beneficial doctrine. As the whole is no greater than
its parts the community is not apt to be more interested in supporting right and repressing
wrong than the citizens who compose it. Responsibility should not be upon society but
upon the individual. Id. at 25. This reasoning was followed in the case of Browning's
Estate, 165 Misc. 819 at 829, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 825 (1938), affd., 281 N.Y. 577, 22 N.E.
(2d) 160 (1939), where the court stated: "There is reason now to approve charitable
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vidualism and collectivism, decisions emphasized the fact that it is the
public which is the real and ultimate beneficiary of charitable activities and it is the duty of the court to enable the public to receive the
benefits of the gifts which have been contributed to it. 48 Consequently
the origins of the cy pres doctrine were re-examined, 49 the prerequisites to the application of the doctrine were found to exist in a greater
number of cases50 and an attentive ear was turned to the needs and
interests of the community.51
In re Dean's Estate, 52 decided in 1938, is an interesting example
of this reversal in attitude. A testator bequeathed a sum of money to
foundations as serving the public good because they restore to better balance the relationship of the individual to his government. To the extent of its resources private charity will
remove the temptation of the underprivileged to regard government as obliged to furnish
support and will aid in the restoration of a sense of personal responsibility among its
donees."
48 Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W. (2d) 278 (1928), cert. den. 279 U.S. 839,
49 S.Ct. 252 (1929); Wachovia Banking and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 107 S.
E. 238 (1921). The following cases placed emphasis on the welfare of the beneficiaries:
State National Bank of Texarkana v. Bann, 202 Ark. 850, 153 S.W. (2d) 158 (1941);
City of Keene v. Eastman, 75 N.H. 191, 72 A. 213 (1909); In re Lawless' Will, 87 N.Y.
S. (2d) 386 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
49 Compare: Noel v. Olds, (D.C. Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 581, affd. (D.C. Cir. 1945)
149 F. (2d) 13 (1945), cert. den. 321 U.S. 773, 64 S.Ct. 611 (1944), with Dinwiddie v.
Metzger, 45 App. D.C. 310 (1916), cert. den. 242 U.S. 631, 37 S.Ct. 15 (1916); Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, (Del. 1948) 61 A. (2d) 110, with Doughten v. Vandever, 5
Del. Ch. 51 (1875); Harwood v. Dick, 286 Ky. 423, 150 S.W. (2d) 704 (1941), with
Adams v. Bohon, 176 Ky. 66, 196 S.W. 156 (1917); Lindquist v. First Evangelical Lutheran Church, 193 Minn. 474, 259 N.W. 9 (1935), with Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn.
210, 100 N.W. 1104 (1904); Hobbs v. Board of Education, 126 Neb. 416, 253 N.W. 627
(1934), with In re Creighton's Estate, 60 Neb. 796, 84 N.W. 273 (1900); Sherman v.
Richmond Hose Co. No. 2, 101 Misc. 62, 166 N.Y.S. 586 (1917), modified by 186 App.
Div. 417, 175 N.Y.S. 8 (1919), affd. 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921), with. Bascom
v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584 (1866); Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 576, 24 N.W.
(2d) 893 (1946), with Estate of Hoffen, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N.W. 407 (1888). Eleven
states enacted cy pres statutes after 1900. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 47, §145, Ala. Code
(1947) tit. 47, §145; Ind. Laws, 1929, 214, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1948) §26-632;
Md. Laws (1945), c. 727, p. 806, Md. Code Ann. (Supp. 1947), art. 16, §279A; Mass.
Laws (1929), c. 126, Mass. Ann. Laws (1950), c. 214, §3(11); Minn. Laws (1927), c.
180, Minn. Stat. Ann. (1950), §501.12(3); New York Laws of 1901, c. 292, §2, New
York Real Property Law (McKinney, 1950) §113(2), and Personal Property Law §12(2);
R.I. Gen. Laws (1923) c. 303, §9, R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 487, §1; Vt. Acts 1945, No.
37, §1, Vt. Stat. (1947) §1282; Va. Acts of 1946, c. 187, Va. Code (Supp. 1948) §587a;
W.Va. Code (1931) p. 933, W.Va. Code (1943) §3502; Wis. Laws (1933) c. 413, Wis.
Stat. (1947) §231.11(7)(b)(c)(d).
50 The three prerequisites to the application of the cy pres doctrine are (1) a valid
charitable trust, (2) a general charitable intention, and (3) the impossibility or impracticality of carrying out the original scheme. F1scH, Tm, CY PRBs DoCTRINE IN nm
UNITED STATES 128 (1950). A trust was implied in the following cases: Goree v.
Georgia Industrial Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 684 (1938); In re Peterson's Estate, 202
Minn. 31, 277 N.W. 529 (1938); Stevens v. Smith, 134 Mo. 175, 183 A. 344 (1936); In
re Walter's Estate, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N.Y.S. 400 (1933); School District No. 70 Red
Willow County v. Wood, 144 Neb. 241, 13 N.W. (2d) 153 (1944). Cf. older cases
where no trust was implied and the cy pres doctrine was held inapplicable: Robinson v.
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be held in trust until a parochial school in connection with a designated
church should be built, the money then to be paid to the church to be
used as an endowment. After a twenty year period had elapsed and the
school had not yet been erected, the court exercising the cy pres doctrine ordered the fund to be paid to the church to be used for purposes
which would as nearly as possible effectuate the intention of the testator. In reaching this decision the court pointed out that the necessity
for a separate Catholic parochial school in the area had been eliminated
as a result of an agreement among the various churches in Millbrook,
New York where classes in religious instruction under the direction of
the different denominations were held in the public schools. In the
opinion of the court "the relationship and spn;it of co-operation existing
between the various religious denominations in Millbrook, N.Y., approaches a state of Utopia ..." and
"... such a departure from the present mode of procedure might
tend to destroy the splendid co-operative spiritual endeavor now in
force. In view of the troubled times through which we are now
passing, such a disruption would indeed be unfortunate."53
The necessity for the charity formulated by the testatrix was also given
weight in determining whether there was a sufficient degree of impracticality or impossibility to authorize the application of the doctrine in
In re Neher's Will, 54 where real property was devised to a village to be
used as a hospital. The village asserted that it was without the resources
necessary to establish and maintain a hospital and that a modem hospital had been recently established in a neighboring village which
Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S.W. 104 (1919); Matter of Rappolt, 140 Misc. 239, 250 N.Y.
S. 377 (1931), accord, Raque v. City of Speyer, Germany, 97 N.J. Eq. 447, 129 A. 207
(1925).
In the following cases the courts found a general charitable intention despite the fact
that the terms of the trust provided that the property be devoted to the specified purpose
"and no other purpose": O'Hara v. Grand Lodge of I.0.0.G.T. of California, 213
Cal. 131, 2 P. (2d) 21 (1931); Grimke v•. Malone, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 899
(1910); In re Harrington's Will, 243 App. Div. 235, 276 N.Y.S. 868 (1935); Graff v.
Harrington, 137 Misc. 712, 244 N.Y.S. 307 (1930); Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249
Wis. 476, 24 N.W. (2d) 893 (1946). In Pennsylvania the requirement of a general
charitable intent has been eliminated by statute. Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.10.
For cases dealing with impracticality and impossibility see notes 52-55 infra.
51 See cases cited infra notes
52 167 Misc. 238, 3 N.Y.S.

52-58.
(2d) 711 (1938). (There was some testimony that the
project would be impractical for the further reason that the parish was small and the expense involved was large).
53 Id. at 240.
54 279 N.Y. 370, 18 N.E. (2d) 625 (1939), reversing, 254 App. Div. 708, 4 N.Y.S.
(2d) 983 (1938). Duplication of facilities was a factor of importance in the following
cases: Exeter v. Robinson, 94 N.H. 463, 55 A. (2d) 622 (1947) (property left to town,
income to be used for the salary of a teacher for the sole instruction of women in a
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would adequately serve the needs of both villages, whereupon the court
ordered the gift to be executed cy pres through a scheme to be framed
by the court.55
Pound's legal theories have also influenced the manner in which
the courts exercise the cy pres doctrine. The degree to which the new
plan, formulated by the court, will be of public service is considered
and with the deviation from emphasis on the individual to society as
a whole the courts have tended to depart from the specified purposes of
the trust to a greater degree than before.56 Thus where funds were
collected to erect a war memorial and the amount was not sufficient for
that purpose the court approved a plan to use the funds for war memorial playground.57 In California a testatrix authorized her executors
to erect a granite tower containing a carillon of eighteen bells . . .
" 'dedicated to the memory of all those who ... strove to make Madera
and Madera County all that it is'." When it was proved impractical to
female seminary to be provided by the town. After 83 years the court ordered the abandonment of separate education of women in the seminary as it was found that the correlation
of the facilities for educating girls with those of the boys high school was not effective
and retarded the development of secondary education in the town. The court directed the
income to be used for the support of teachers only instructing females in a co-educational
system); Board of Education of City of Rockford v. City of Rockford, 372 ill. 442, 24 N.E.
(2d) 366 (1940) (where buildings of school erected under a trust for the benefit of inhabitants of a particular school district had become obsolete, and the area in which the
buildings stood was served by a new school the court held the cy pres doctrine applicable);
Town of Milton v. Attorney General, 314 Mass. 234, 49 N.E. (2d) 909 (1943); School
District No. 70, Red Willow County v. Wood, 144 Neb. 241, 13 N.W. (2d) 153 (1944)
(bequest to school district for the construction of a building when the fund should grow to
a specified amount. While fund was accumulating the district erected a new building and
the court applied the cy pres doctrine to the bequest). Statutory recognition of the welfare
of the community is found in Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1948) §§26-631, 26-632 which provides that "where any funds shall have been created by general donation to carry on activities of a charitable, humane, philanthropic or other nature for the common good; and where
the organization carrying on said activity, or where the need of said funds for the purpose
for which the same was created, have ceased to exist, without using all of the funds so
collected" the board of commissioners of the various counties are authorized to "make distribution of said funds as in their judgment will best serve the interests of the residents of
the political division from which the same shall have been received."
55 Court authorized property to be used as a memorial administration building. Matter
of Neher, 279 N.Y. 370, 8 N.E. (2d) 625 (1939).
56Jn re Butin's Estate, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 176, 183 P. (2d) 304 (1947); Society of
California Pioneers v. McElroy, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 332, 146 P. (2d) 962 (1944) (gift to
society to construct a monument may be applied for the general historical purpose of the
society); Connors v. Ahearn, 342 Pa. 5, 19 A. (2d) 388 (1941); cf. Seymour v. Attorney
General, 124 Conn. 490, 200 A. 815 (1938) (gift for a memorial was not permitted to be
used for a library); Kerner v. Thompson, 293 ill. App. 454, 13 N.E. (2d) 110 (1938),
cert. den. 305 U.S. 635, 59 S.Ct. 102 (1938) (surplus of fund for the purpose of relieving
the suffering caused by Hoods of the Mississippi River could not be used for Hood control).
li7Berle v. Dawkins, 150 Misc. 911, 271 N.Y.S. 579 (1934).
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carry out the bequest the court stated that a substitute memorial might
take the form of a health center.68
Pound's belief, that the common-law stress on individualism when
carried beyond its time and established as the basis of a permanent
theory of society is dangerous,69 accords with the position that a society
in which there is a more or less even distribution of wealth is apt to be
more stable and peaceful than one where there are great extremes of
wealth and poverty. It has been aptly put by Friedrich when he said:
'When emulation becomes embittered envy, when the ambition to rise
and make more of oneself becomes frustration and hopelessness . . .
then social unity and stability are torn by social discord." 60 Judicial
recognition of this viewpoint was expressed in Wachovia Banking &
Trust Co. v. Oghurn, 61 where it was held that a trust did not fail even
though the funds were not adequate for the full design. The court
stated:
"... those rich men should be remembered with honor who devote some part of their estate to widen opportunity and enjoyment
for the public. In death, as in life, those who have accumulated
large estates should have regard 'for the spears of Judah and the
archers of Benjamin'-that solid mass of men who have lived in
poverty or struggled through life on small means, yet whose lawabiding spirit has protected the property of those who have made
large accumulations of wealth, in safety and untroubled by the
spoiler. "62
The same attitude is found in Browning's Estate, 63 where the Surrogate
declared that with a sense of personal social responsibility for wealth
"... there is little temptation to the violent explosions which in other
lands have been based in part upon this disparity in the possession of
worldly goods." 64
Thus the courts of today, believing that the public good is served by
a liberal enforcement of the purposes of the donor, apply the cy pres
doctrine whenever possible and support charitable trusts to the limits
of the doctrine.
68 In re Butin's Estate, 81 Cal.
69 Supra note 46.
60 Friedrich, ''The Economics

App. (2d) 76, 183 P. (2d) 304 (1947).

of Inheritance," in SoCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CoNCEPTs 35 (1948) (published by N.Y. Univ. School of Law).
61181 N.C. 324, 107 S.E. 238 (1921).
62 Id. at 331.
63 165 Misc. 819, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 825 (1938), affd. 281 N.Y. 577, 22 N.E. (2d) 160
(1939).
64 165 Misc. 819 at 829.

